Public economics and development action : an introduction to a special issue in International Tax and Public Finance by Pirttilä, Jukka & Tarp, Finn
International Tax and Public Finance (2019) 26:967–971
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-019-09557-6
EDITORIAL
Public economics and development action: an introduction
to a special issue in International Tax and Public Finance
Jukka Pirttilä1,2,3 · Finn Tarp3,4
Published online: 26 July 2019
© The Author(s) 2019
Tax, and public-sector matters more generally, is high on the agenda of international
development. This is clearly reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
approved by the United Nations General Assembly in September of 2015. SDG17
addresses the need for improving domestic resource mobilization (DRM) directly,
and most of the other SDGs cannot be achieved without adequate tax and spending
policies. To give just a few examples, SDG10 (reduced inequalities) will depend on
government capacity to redistribute income, whereas SDG8 (decent work) requires
that tax systems do not create an unnecessarily large burden on economic efficiency.
Together these goals reflect the classic efficiency–equity trade-off, which is at the heart
of public economics research and policy analysis. Finally, unless all households have
sufficient market income (a highly unlikely scenario), the very first SDG (eradicating
poverty) requires the presence of social safety nets, which must be financed by public
monies.
This is the backdrop, against which UNU-WIDER organized a WIDER Develop-
ment Conference on the theme of “Public Economics for Development” in Maputo,
Mozambique, 5–6 July 2017. The conference was wide-ranging, including papers and
keynote lectures on all areas of public economics, as applied to developing country
contexts. This special issue includes five studies from the conference. In what fol-
lows, we first reflect briefly on a set of key issues when researching the public sector
in developing countries before summarizing the selected articles.
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1 Key issues in public-sector economics for developing countries
First, low-income countries tend to have lower quality institutions, and the constraints
the governments face in developing countries are in many ways different from those
in their high-income counterparts. This means that public finance solutions that work
well in developed countries are not necessarily suitable for developing economies. An
example is the progressive income tax system. It is unlikely to work well in contexts
where many work outside the modern sector. The implication is that redistribution
must rely in large measure on expenditure-side policies. The corporate income tax is
also likely to be too complicated a tool vis-à-vis the taxing of small- and medium-sized
businesses (SMEs), suggesting that simpler presumptive taxes should be considered
instead.
Second, shortcomings in administrative capacity also relate to low fiscal capacity.
Although the tax-to-GDP ratio has, on average, increased among low-income countries
(See Fig. 1), one can safely state that the current level (around 15 per cent of GDP)
remains too low to finance necessary development spending. While increasing the tax
take is, on this background, a key goal in the tax and development agenda, such efforts
must not create unnecessary distortions on private-sector development.
Third, and closely related to what we said above, tax systems in developing countries
need to be designed with the small formal sector in mind. Taxes, almost by definition,
fall on the formal sector, and although the tax-to-GDP rate may be low, tax rates
on formal employers and employees may in many cases well be quite substantial.
Increasing the tax base to cover the present informal sector is, thus, an indispensable
step to raise tax revenues in developing countries.
Fourth, a particular feature of developing economies is the phenomenon of the
“missing middle” (see e.g. Dharmapala et al. 2011). The notion of the missing middle
refers to the empirical regularity that the distribution of firms is dominated by a large
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Fig. 1 Total tax revenue including social security contributions by income groups. Source: Own calculations
based on GRD data
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share of largely informal small firms and some large (even multinational) companies,
whereas the medium-sized firm category is largely missing. This creates two pressures
to taxing businesses: One needs to worry about building tax systems that create incen-
tives for small businesses to grow, and at the same time, it is vital to make sure that
large, multinational, companies pay a fair share of taxes. The latter goal is particularly
challenging. It is widely expected that these companies often engage in tax planning
via international profit shifting.
Finally, because of the extraordinarily high levels of inequality in many developing
countries, distributional concerns are even more pressing than in developed countries.
Yet, in addressing these concerns, analysts often face a severe lack of statistical evi-
dence. The UN SDGs called for a data revolution, inter alia because it is common
that a clear and detailed picture of the severity of inequality is missing. This is so for
many reasons, including that survey-based measures of inequality are highly likely to
underestimate the true state of inequality.1
2 Studies in this issue
The articles in this issue provide a broad picture of some of the main challenges in tax
and development research. The authors rely on different methodologies, ranging from
theory via macro-level empirical work to studies using administrative micro-data sets.
They cover institutions, inequality, international taxation, and the taxation of SMEs.
The first article “What Determines Administrative Capacity in Developing Coun-
tries?”, by Ricciuti, Savoia and Sen,2 sets the scene by examining how to enhance the
quality of public-sector management in developing countries. This, if anything, is a
top priority for development. Even ample public revenues will not result in effective
development action and outcomes if not spent wisely. The authors use data from a
recent project on Public Expenditure Financial Accountability (PEFA) and the Polity
IV database to explore the long-run determinants of public-sector management capac-
ity. They first establish that the constraints to the executive, as measured by the Polity
project, are positively associated with good practices in public-sector management.
Using a host of econometric techniques, including instrumental variables regressions,
they argue that there is also a causal link from political institutions, such as a stronger
system of checks and balances on the executive, on improved practices of public spend-
ing. This is an important finding. While progress in changing political institutions is
by no means straightforward, it is not impossible either, and policymakers should take
note of the finding.
The second study “Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption”, by
Epstein and Gang, expands on the theme of institutional quality. They set up a
game-theoretic model between two constituencies (the rich and the poor) and the
tax administration, in circumstances of high inequality and less-than-perfect admin-
1 This is, for example, due to underreporting at both ends of the income distribution in surveys or simply
because higher income households refuse to participate in surveys or because low-income people are not
reached.
2 The Editor-in-Chief of ITAX, Ron Davies handled the review process of this paper as well that of by
Boonzaaier et al.
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istrative capacity. A key characteristic in their framework is the endogeneity of the
tax enforcement level, which the two competing groups try to influence. One of the
results is the possibility of a poverty trap, an endogenously selected low enforcement
state when other, better, equilibria would have been attainable. The paper highlights
some of the forces that lead to chosen tax capacity and in this way provides pointers
as to how to tackle weak enforcement.
The third article “The Effect of Top Incomes on Inequality in South Africa”, by
Hundenborn, Woolard, and Jellema, relates as well to inequality, this time to its mea-
surement. As alluded to above, a common worry when measuring top incomes in
developing countries is that the surveys used for this purpose may not capture very
well the actual incomes of the rich. The novelty this paper offers is the combina-
tion of survey data and administrative information, and especially matching the two
using recent statistical techniques. The paper demonstrates how to do this in the con-
text of South Africa, and the results reveal that while, quite surprisingly, the survey
over-reports incomes of upper middle classes, top incomes are indeed under-reported.
Using information from 2 years, the authors then demonstrate that income inequality
has fallen slightly in South Africa in recent years.
Turning to international tax issues, the fourth article, entitled “Estimating the Scale
of Profit Shifting and Tax Revenue Losses Related to Foreign Direct Investment”, by
Janský and Palanský, uses macro-level data from the UNU-WIDER Government Rev-
enue Dataset3 and re-estimates some of the recent, influential, regression estimations
used to gauge the extent of international profit shifting. Their results confirm earlier
findings that substantial international income shifting takes place across countries.
In addition, the extent of the profit shifting appears to harm poorer countries rela-
tively more, when measured as a share of GDP, noting that there could also be other
country-specific differences in the relative significance of lost revenues.
Finally, the fifth paper “How do Small Firms Respond to Tax Schedule Discontinu-
ities? Evidence from South African Tax Registers”, by Boonzaaier, Harju, Matikka,
and Pirttilä, examines again taxation of business income, this time focusing on SMEs
using administrative taxpayer level data from South Africa. The country operates
a special tax regime for small business corporations (SBCs), where the corporate
income tax is progressive and has lower rates than the standard 28 per cent CIT rate.
Using the bunching estimator, the authors demonstrate sharp reactions of SBCs to
the tax incentives, translating into substantial elasticities. The key question is whether
these reactions reflect true economic choices (such as those related to investment and
employment) or reporting behaviour. The authors argue that the sharp bunching and
immediate responses to the change in the tax incentives likely reflect the fact that
reporting behaviour is responsible for much of the observed bunching.
Arguably, the articles in this issue speak to some of the key policy matters in
public-sector economics for developing countries. We hope that the readers of this
issue will find the articles informative and that they will stimulate further research
in the challenging area of public economics and development action in developing
countries.
3 ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2018) Government Revenue Dataset.
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